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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050301-CA

v.
BRIAN RAY KARSTEN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on two counts of
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine and
cocaine) and one count of driving with a measurable controlled
substance in the body (R. 58-59).

This court has jurisdiction

over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(West
2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the officer have reasonable suspicion to stop

defendant after he observed a clear statutory equipment
violation?
2.

In the course of a stop initiated for a statutory

equipment violation, did the officer have reasonable suspicion to
frisk defendant after the officer observed two knives in

defendant's vehicle, one of which was described as "an assault
type weapon," and was concerned that defendant might have yet
another weapon on his person?
A non-deferential, correctness standard applies to appellate
review of the reasonableness of traffic stops and Terry frisks.
State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 1 15, 103 P.3d 699; State v. Warren,
2003 UT 36, f 12, 78 P.3d 590.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-140(2) (West 2004), governing display
of red or blue lights, provides:
(2) Except as required in Sections 41-6-132
and 41-6-140.10, a person may not drive or
move any vehicle or equipment upon any
highway with any lamp cr device capable of
displaying a red or blue light visible from
directly in front of the center of the
vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16 (West 2004), granting peace officers
the authority to frisk suspects for dangerous weapons, provides:
A peace officer who has stopped a person
temporarily for questioning may frisk the
person for a dangerous weapon if he
reasonably believes he or any other person is
in danger.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with four criminal counts: possession
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree
felony; possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third
degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor; and driving with a measurable controlled substance
-2-

in the blood, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). Defendant filed a
motion to suppress, which the trial court denied after an
evidentiary hearing (R. 17-22, 62). Defendant then entered a
conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession of a
controlled substance, one a third degree felony and the other a
class A misdemeanor; and one count of driving with a measurable
controlled substance in the blood, a class B misdemeanor (R. 3138).

The court ordered zero-to-five years in the Utah State

Prison on the felony charge, one year in the county jail on the
class A misdemeanor, and six months in the county jail on the
class B misdemeanor, as well as a fine of $1555 (R. 58). The
court stayed incarceration, ordered probation for 36 months, and
imposed multiple conditions, including sixty days in the county
jail (R- 59). Defendant filed a motion for certificate of
probable cause, which the court denied (R. 53-55, 65). Defendant
also filed a notice of appeal (R. 50).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On a late July evening, Officer Taylor of the Utah Highway
Patrol stopped a red GTO as it drove into Bluff, Utah (R. 62: 4,
11).

Officer Taylor testified that he stopped the vehicle

because of an equipment violation, specifically two blue lights
facing forward above the license plate area, a violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-140(2) (Id. at 5).

-3-

Defendant described the blue

lights as "accent'" lights in the shape of skulls with "little
eyeballs" that apparently lit up (R. 62: 21). 1
The officer approached the vehicle and noticed a knife on
the floor in the backseat area behind the driver (Id. at 7, 14).
He also observed that "[b]asically the inside of this car had no
interior.

It just had metal.

You could see the roof. . . . it's

like he's restoring [the car]" (Id. at 6, 16).
Officer Taylor made contact with the driver, explained the
violation, and asked for license, registration, and proof of
insurance.

Noticing a problem with the insurance card, the

officer requested another one (Id. at 5 ) . Defendant had his
paperwork "wedged in where the sheet metal is" in the visor area
of the roof right above his head (Id. at 6, 7 ) . As defendant
moved toward this area, the officer also saw a large knife, which
he later described as "an assault type weapon," concealed in the
same place (Id. at 5-6, 10). At that point, the officer decided
to remove defendant from his vehicle (Id. at 6 ) .
While the officer was doing this, he spoke briefly with
another officer who was present.

He told the other officer that

he could see a knife (Id. at 6-7).

The other officer responded

that he could also see a knife (Id. at 7 ) . Given where each
officer was standing, Officer Taylor assumed they were seeing two
different knives (Id.).
1

Defendant acknowledged that the lights came with a
warning stating that their use on vehicles might be illegal (Id.
at 23) .
-4-

Once defendant was out of his car, Officer Taylor frisked
He testified, n(W)here there were so many other knifes

him.

[sic], I decided to Terry frisk him to be sure there were no
other knifes on the subject'' (Id. ) . Of the pat-down, Officer
Taylor stated, "I immediately upon touching his left front
pocket, I recognized what was consistent with a drug pipe . . .
with a bowl on it" (Id.).

He said he knew what the object was as

soon as he touched it (Id. at 8). Officer Taylor handcuffed
defendant and removed the pipe from his pocket (Id.).
After giving defendant a Miranda warning, the officer
removed a small bottle containing cocaine and a small tin box
containing methamphetamine from defendant's front pocket (Id. at
8-9) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop him because the statute he was accused of
violating was not intended to cover the kind of lights he was
displaying and because the stop was for an equipment, rather than
a safety violation.

Both of these arguments lack merit.

First,

by its plain language, the statute includes "any" lights
displayed on the front of the car, which would clearly include
the blue skull lights defendant had over his front license plate.
Second, equipment violations are traffic violations and, as such,
they justify investigative stops by law enforcement.

-5-

Defendant also argues that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to frisk him.

He argues that although he had two

knives visible in his car, the fact that he cooperated with the
officer by getting out of the car mitigated any danger he might
otherwise have posed.

Under the totality of the circumstances,

however, the officer reasonably inferred that someone who kept an
assault-type weapon within arm's reach in his vehicle might also
be concerned enough about his personal safety to carry an
additional weapon on his person.

Because the officer's personal

observations gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant
could be armed and dangerous, the officer was justified in
conducting a Terry frisk.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO STOP DEFENDANT AFTER
HE OBSERVED A CLEAR STATUTORY
EQUIPMENT VIOLATION
Defendant argues that a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6140(2) (West 2004) does not give rise to reasonable suspicion to
stop a vehicle for two reasons: first, the statute "was not
intended to cover small decorative lights on license plate
holders, although such lights may technically fall within the
statutory prohibition;" and, second, this was merely an equipment
violation, not a safety violation (Br. of Aplt. at 5-7).
Defendant's arguments are unavailing.

First, the law is

well-settled that "[w]here statutory language is plain and
-6-

unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine
legislative intent.

Rather, we are guided by the rule that a

statute should generally be construed according to its plain
language."

Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah

1989)(citation omitted); accord State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312
(Utah 1995) (M>The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of
the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of the
Act.'" (citation omitted)); Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844,
850 n.14 (Utah 1994)(explaining statutory language is the first
source of statutory interpretation).

Where statutory language is

plain, appellate courts will look no further.

>x A

When language is

clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses,
and no room is left for construction.'" State v. Hardy, 2002 UT
App 244, f 10, 54 P.3d 645 (citation omitted).
The statutory language in this case could not be more clear:
(2) Except as required in Sections 41-6-132
and 41-6-140.10, a person may not drive or
move any vehicle or equipment upon any
highway with any lamp or device capable of
displaying a red or blue light visible from
directly in front of the center of the
vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-140(2) (emphasis added) [2] .

The use of the

word "any" before the phrase "lamp or device. . ." unambiguously
includes all possible lights, not just those that could be
confused with the lights referenced in sections 41-6-132 and 41-

2

These sections govern use of red and blue emergency
lights and flashing red lights on school busses.
-7-

6-140.10.

If the legislature had intended a more limited

category of lights to be proscribed, it would not have used the
word "any" to modify the phrase "lamp or device."

No resort to

statutory intent, therefore, is necessary to interpret the
statute.

The blue skull lights displayed by defendant in front

of his license plate constituted a clear violation of the plain
language of section § 41-6-140(2), thus giving rise to reasonable
suspicion to stop his vehicle.
Second, the fact that the display of blue lights constituted
an equipment violation rather than a safety violation does
nothing to defeat reasonable suspicion.

vv

[A] s long as an officer

suspects that the Mriver is violating any one of the multitude
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the police
officer may legally stop the vehicle."

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d

1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
661 (1979)); see also State v. Spurqeon, 904 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah
App. 1995)(providing that equipment violations are traffic
violations justifying investigative stop by law enforcement).
The distinction defendant seeks to draw between safety and
equipment violations has no basis in the law.
The trial court ruled: "I'm confident there was a violation
observed of 41-6-140 subparagraph (2).

It may not be the most

momentous problem in the code, but still I think it's within the
legitimate authority of the legislature to prohibit those kinds
of lights.

So he had the right to stop him" (R. 62: 31 at

-8-

addendum A ) .

Because the trial court's ruling comports with

unequivocal case law, defendant's claim fails.
POINT TWO
THE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO FRISK WHERE HE
OBSERVED TWO KNIVES IN DEFENDANT'S
VEHICLE, ONE OF WHICH WAS "AN
ASSAULT TYPE WEAPON/' AND WAS
CONCERNED THAT DEFENDANT MIGHT HAVE
YET ANOTHER WEAPON ON HIS PERSON
Defendant argues that although the officer had reasonable
suspicion to believe that defendant was armed when he was in the
vehicle, once defendant complied with the officer's request and
got out of the vehicle, he was separated from his weapons, thus
mitigating any danger to the officer.

See Br. of Aplt. at 9-11.

Consequently, defendant contends, the officer did not have
reasonable suspicion to frisk him.
The trial court disagreed, determining that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant:
You can't say when somebody's out of the car
that if they've got a weapon on their person
that they can't get to that. They certainly
can. . .
To me, given that you'd already seen two
knifes [sic], it was reasonable to be
concerned that this individual had another
knife, that should he choose to resist the
police, might be used by him for that
purpose. In a place like Bluff, on the
outskirts of Bluff, you wouldn't count on
there being any public notice or to dissuade
that individual [ s i c ] . . . .
I think it would be a terrible mistake and
expose law officers to unwarranted danger to
prohibit them from frisking under these
-9-

circumstances. He's seen two knifes [sic] in
the vehicle. I think he has the right to
check to make sure this individual doesn't
have another one in his pocket.
R. 62: 32-33 at addendum A.
The trial court ruling is correct.

Both statutory and case

law make clear that an officer may conduct a weapons frisk of an
individual who has been properly stopped if the officer
reasonably believes that he or anyone else is in danger.

See,

e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); State v. Carter, 707
P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (West 2004).
"The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual
is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger."

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord

State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986).

The officer's

reasonable belief must, of course, be supported by "specific and
articulable facts" as well as the "rational inferences" that may
be drawn from those facts.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.

"Since no one

factor is determinative of reasonableness, a trial judge must
determine the reasonableness of a frisk in light of all the
facts."

Carter, 707 P.2d at 659; accord State v. Humphrey, 937

P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App. 1997) (articulating totality of the
circumstances test).
Here, the officer observed one knife on the floor in the
backseat area of the car and another within the driver's reach
(R. 62: 5-6, 10). Of the knife accessible by the driver, the
-10-

officer testified, "I've never seen a knife like this, other than
it looks like to me an assault type weapon.

It's meant to be

gripped, and I've never seen a weapon — a knife like that in a
concealment place where it was.

All I could figure it was for

was to ward off someone, more of an assault type weapon" (Id. at
10) .
Having seen two knives, the officer sought to separate
defendant from these weapons and to ensure he had no others (Id.
at 7 ) . While defendant was wholly cooperative with the officer
when asked to get out of the car, defendant's compliance did
nothing to diminish the officer's concern for his personal
safety.

In essence, the officer fairly inferred that someone who

kept an assault-type weapon within arm's reach in his vehicle
might be concerned enough about his personal safety to carry
another dangerous weapon on his person.

This inference was

rational in light of the unusually dangerous character of the
knife and its storage in such close proximity to defendant.
Because the officer reasonably believed that defendant might be
able to obtain control over another weapon and thus present a
danger to him, the officer conducted a protective frisk.
is necessary to support a Terry frisk.
P.3d 699, 1 32.

-11-

No more

See State v. Brake, 103

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on two counts of possession of a controlled substance,
one a third degree felony and the other a class A misdemeanor,
and one count of driving with a measurable controlled substance
in the blood, a class B misdemeanor.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this S

day of October, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Aric Cramer, Cramer & Cramer, Smith Hyatt Building,
845 South Main Street, Suite 23, Bountiful, Utah 84010, this 3 ^
day of October, 2005.
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Addendum A

Addendum A

-311

five minutes, but I think that that's the analysis.

2

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

3

MR. CRAMER: Thank you, your Honor.

4

THE COURT: Mr. Halls, I'm going to give you a chance

5

to put anything on the record that you think needs to be on the

6

record, but I know what I should do here.

7

the motion to suppress.

8 I
9

I'm going to deny

I have read what I think are the operative, pertinent
portions in each of the four cases that Mr. Cramer has given

10

me;

11

2004 Utah 95; State vs. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185; State vs. Warren,

12

78 P.3d 590.

13

State vs. Galvin, 37 P.3d 1197; State vs. Brake, which is

I think the initial stop was proper.

Seems like

14

therewas a violation —

I'm confident there was a violation

15

observed of 41-6-140 subparagraph (2). It may not be the most

16

momentous problem in the code, but still I think it's within

17

the legitimate authority of the legislature to prohibit those

18

kinds of lights.

So he had the right to stop him.

19

Having observed two knifes, and the one knife I saw is

20

more than a pocketknife, creates considerably more concern than

21

a pocketknife.

22

were cited, where we're talking about going back and searching

23

a vehicle after removing the occupant from the vehicle.

24
25

This is not a case, like some of the cases that

This is a case where we're just talking about frisking
the occupant, and I think that's a case where there's less

-321

impact.

2

when somebody's out of the car that if they've got a weapon on

3

their person that they can't get to that.

4

It's more focused on the real risk.

You can't say

They certainly can.

To me, given that you'd already seen two knifes, it

5

was reasonable to be concerned that this individual had another

6

knife, that should he choose to resist the police, might be

7

used by him for that purpose.
I

In a place like Bluff, on the
\

8

outskirts of Bluff, you wouldn't count on there being any

9

public notice or to dissuade that individual.

10

Now, this is a difficult area, I think, for the

11

Courts, because I think they're reluctant to say everybody

12

you stop, you can frisk.

13

certain, there has to be a 50/50 chance this guy's going to

14

pull a knife on you and stab you before you can actually check

15

for it, then we're going to lose 50 percent of the officers in

16

these circumstances.

17

Yet if you have to be 50 percent

I don't think that's the standard.

I think ib has

18

to be a standard that allows officers to protect themselves

19

at lower levels of risk than that.

20

specifically on point.

21

I suppose —

So I haven't seen a case

well, I know that I'll be subject to

22

correction if I'm wrong about this, but I think it would be a

23

terrible mistake and expose law officers to unwarranted danger

24

to prohibit them from frisking under these circumstances.

25

seen two knifes in the vehicle.

He's

I think he has the right to
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check to make sure this individual doesn't have another one in

2

his pocket.

3

about who's a law enforcement officer, I would desperately hope

4

that he can do that for his own safety, or her own safety.

I hope he would.

If it were anyone that I care

5

MR. HALLS: Your Honor, just

—

6

THE COURT: You can put on the record what you want to,

7

in case, you know, there would be any question about whether

8

you made an argument or not, Mr. Halls.

9 I

MR. HALLS: Two other minor things for the record would

10

be, your Honor, that the actual character of the knife, the

11

officer said he recognized it as being more of an assault knife

12

than any kind of utility knife, or functional or any other kind

13

of a

—

14

THE COURT: Looks kind of like a small cling on knife.

15

MR. HALLS: It has like a brass knuckle component to

16

it, and it's got serrated edge on the top and it's sharp on

17

the bottom.

18

was there.

19

So he said he noticed that about the knife as it

The second thing he noticed before he did the

—

20

another thing that he noticed before doing the frisk was the

21

other officer said —

22

out.

23

he said, "I can see a knife,'' and got him

The other officer said, "I can also see knifes."
So there were another indication from the other

24

officer there were other knifes that could be seen, besides

25

the one that he was observing.

I think that gives another

